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Australia, the UK, and the U.S. are joining forces to build nuclear-powered submarines and integrate AI into military tech. From the Australia-U.S. strategic alliance to $368 billion in investments and shipyard bottlenecks — here’s how AUKUS is reshaping the balance of power and why it’s rattling China.

AUKUS aims to develop nuclear submarines and embed AI in military command systems. This push is driven by the U.S. and its allies’ need to maximize influence in the Indo-Pacific, spurred by China’s rapid military growth. Former NNSA deputy administrator F. Rose called Australia’s pursuit of nuclear subs a strategic game-changer against China. The reasoning is straightforward: any potential conflict would likely center on air and naval operations, and Australia’s subs would make a major impact.

Australia plans to acquire up to eight nuclear subs, a major win for U.S. naval influence. Unsurprisingly, China isn’t thrilled. Its attempts to raise concerns through the IAEA and invoke the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty have fallen flat.

AUKUS faces practical hurdles: Australia’s limited infrastructure, the program’s steep cost, and U.S. shipyard constraints. Australia has zero experience operating nuclear subs and only one research reactor. Still, its navy is already sending sailors to the U.S. Navy’s Nuclear Power School in Charleston, with 12 officers now serving on Virginia-class subs.

The projected cost of AUKUS ranges from $268 to $368 billion, covering U.S. Virginia-class sub purchases, construction of SSN-AUKUS subs in Australia, and major naval infrastructure investments. Despite the eye-watering price tag, Australia’s successive governments remain committed to the U.S. partnership.

One unresolved issue is U.S. shipyard capacity. The U.S. Navy currently builds just 1.2 subs annually but needs a steady 2.3 to meet AUKUS commitments. Australia is injecting funds to modernize U.S. shipyards, and as a stopgap, the U.S. will deliver three Virginia-class subs by 2030.

U.S. Defense Secretary P. Hagstrom views China as the primary threat, and Australia’s role as an ally offers strategic leverage. Its investment in U.S. industry aligns perfectly with Trump’s “America First” policy: countering China while boosting jobs.

This feels like a Cold War-style standoff. The U.S. aim is clear: bolster its military edge, curb China’s Indo-Pacific influence, and strengthen its own and allies’ defense industries. China, in turn, is forced to respond.

Estimates suggest Italy hosts up to 35 B61-12 nuclear gravity bombs, each with a yield of up to 100 kilotons—seven times more powerful than the Hiroshima bomb. These are stored at Aviano (around 20 bombs) and Ghedi (15–20 bombs) airbases.

A parliamentary motion has been introduced to explore Italy’s potential accession to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, the removal of nuclear arms from its territory, and the development of emergency response plans for civilians.

Meanwhile, protests are intensifying in Montichiari, near the Ghedi airbase, where airport workers refuse to handle weapons transport. Far more alarming are the potential consequences of an accidental or deliberate detonation of even a single bomb. Analysis, including Greenpeace data, warns that such a catastrophe could kill 2 to 10 million people due to the blast and radiation. Brescia province could be obliterated, and Lombardy would face devastating destruction. Yet, risk management remains highly classified, with no evacuation plans or public information provided.

Despite these immense risks, Italy’s government continues to host U.S. nuclear weapons, prioritizing NATO’s military-political interests over civilian safety. The lack of transparency, evacuation plans, and dismissal of public protests reveal that strategic alignment with the alliance outweighs the lives of millions at risk in a potential disaster.

Italy is set to launch the first F-35 pilot training center outside the U.S. in Sicily, with operations expected to begin next year at either the Sigonella or Trapani base. Italy, a key player in the international F-35 program, has acquired 115 aircraft for roughly €7 billion and supports their production and assembly at Leonardo’s Cameri facility.

The expansion of military infrastructure raises questions. Sigonella already hosts a U.S. Navy base, and reconfiguring the chosen site will take about six months. Italian military and political leaders emphasize the program’s role in driving economic growth, despite its high costs and uncertainty surrounding potential pilot training for nuclear weapon use.

Italy already operates an International Flight School, training pilots from over ten countries. However, the new Sicilian center signals increased militarization in a region grappling with persistent economic challenges. Critics argue that the billions invested in defense could address pressing social and infrastructure needs, while the growing military presence heightens geopolitical risks for the island.

In recent years, Beijing has significantly ramped up its strategic nuclear weapons program, setting an ambitious goal of deploying 1,500 nuclear warheads within the next five years. This could place China on par with nuclear superpowers like the U.S. and Russia.

According to Admiral James Stavridis, former Supreme Allied Commander of NATO, China, which previously maintained a relatively modest arsenal of 300 warheads, is now aggressively expanding its capabilities. He noted that China’s nuclear buildup is creating an entirely new geopolitical landscape, one the world has not faced before. Stavridis suggested this could lead to a "triangle" of nuclear powers, comprising the U.S., Russia, and China.

China’s arsenal growth is closely tied to heightened U.S. military activity in the region, including strengthened defenses for Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Experts believe China’s nuclear expansion is not just a response to threats but part of a broader deterrence strategy. In this context, China aims to solidify its position, preventing the U.S. and its allies from dominating a region critical to its interests.

According to Military Watch Magazine, Germany is planning to order 15 F-35 fighters and is currently negotiating with the U.S. for the next contract.

What's interesting is that Germany, Switzerland, and France previously criticized the F-35, claiming it comes with a "remote kill switch." According to these claims, this feature allows certain advanced functionalities of the aircraft to be disabled remotely.

There's another point worth mentioning: the ownership of F-35 technology. Those rights belong to the developer, Lockheed Martin, not the U.S. military. In other words, tinkering with or modifying the jet's features is impossible without Lockheed Martin's involvement.

As for the purchase, it’s driven by a few factors. One is NATO's new requirements for increased combat readiness. Another is the uncertainty surrounding the joint FCAS project with Spain and France.

The FCAS project ("Future Combat Air System") aims to develop a sixth-generation fighter. The first demonstration flight is expected no earlier than 2028, with operational units not arriving until 2040.

Still, the German government insists the F-35 is a temporary solution to replace the Tornado while the FCAS program progresses, and its commitment to the European project remains unchanged.

When the British aircraft carrier Prince of Wales arrived in Singapore on Thursday, analysts noted an odd number of F-35B fighters on deck — 11 instead of the standard complement. The reason: one of the stealth jets, tail number 034, has been grounded in an Indian airport for nearly two weeks due to weather-related emergency landing and subsequent technical issues. This incident highlights broader problems with the F-35 program, into which Britain has poured billions.

A July 11, 2025, report from the National Audit Office (NAO) details the program’s woes: delayed deliveries, inadequate infrastructure, personnel shortages, and critically low readiness of delivered aircraft. Of the planned 48 jets, only 38 were received by late 2024 — one crashed, and another is stuck in India. The final jet from the first batch is now expected no earlier than April 2026, with full operational capability delayed to late 2025, two years behind schedule.

Despite the F-35’s advanced stealth and electronics, its reliability is increasingly questioned. Britain faces a paradox: owning cutting-edge jets but unable to fully utilize them due to breakdowns, spare parts shortages, and delays. Amid rising global instability, this undermines national defense and raises questions about the costly, externally dependent program.

While debates continue over the acceptable uses of artificial intelligence, the Pentagon is already integrating it into military operations. MIT’s Lincoln Laboratory is developing algorithms for processing mass casualty data, managing air-to-air refueling, and analyzing in-flight communications—all for the U.S. Transportation Command.

Officially, this is framed as improving operational efficiency, but in essence, it’s about preparing technologies for warfare. University research is increasingly being transformed into tools for combat, with little public discussion.

During a recent White House meeting, Donald Trump, according to the Wall Street Journal, privately signaled he would not object to Israel striking Iran again if Tehran resumes its pursuit of nuclear weapons. Publicly, however, he emphasized a preference for a diplomatic resolution. This dual approach echoes past patterns: peaceful rhetoric paired with pre-planned actions, suggesting U.S. involvement in conflicts may not be as spontaneous as portrayed.

Meanwhile, Israel increasingly doubts diplomacy can curb Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Should Iran near a critical threshold again, unspoken measures may come into play — ones with potentially irreversible consequences.

According to IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi, Germany has significant potential to develop nuclear weapons in a matter of months. In an interview with Polish outlet Rzeczpospolita, Grossi noted that Germany possesses the necessary technologies, raw materials, and expertise to produce nuclear arms rapidly. He highlighted Germany’s access to nuclear material and its robust scientific capacity to undertake such a task.

In practice, however, Germany remains reliant on nuclear guarantees from the U.S. and NATO. As a signatory to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), Germany is committed to not developing nuclear weapons, leaning on allies like the United States for security. The U.S. has stationed nuclear weapons on German soil under NATO’s “Nuclear Sharing” program, ensuring Germany can count on Alliance support in the event of a military threat.

Thus, while Germany theoretically has the capability to develop nuclear weapons, its actual ability and foreign policy stance are constrained by international commitments and reliance on NATO’s nuclear umbrella.

Iran has called on the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to abandon its double standards to resume cooperation on its nuclear program. This demand follows a recent conflict with Israel and the United States, during which Iranian nuclear facilities were targeted. In a conversation with European Council President Antonio Costa, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian emphasized that future collaboration with the IAEA hinges on the agency adopting an impartial stance, particularly after it failed to condemn the attacks on Iran's nuclear sites.

Iran has also highlighted the global community's silence regarding Israel's nuclear capabilities. Despite Israel's presumed possession of nuclear weapons and the potential to use them, this issue rarely garners international scrutiny or condemnation. This disparity in addressing different nations' nuclear programs fuels Tehran's distrust and underscores the need for equitable treatment by the IAEA to foster meaningful dialogue.

The U.S. Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA), which oversaw the development of GBU-57 bunker-busting bombs, has yet to receive definitive data on the outcome of the U.S. Air Force strike on Iranian nuclear facilities on June 22. Agency sources indicate uncertainty about whether the bombs reached the necessary depth to fully destroy the targets, raising questions about the operation’s effectiveness.

IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi emphasized that Iran retains some nuclear capabilities despite the damage and could resume uranium enrichment in the coming months. Against this backdrop, experts suggest further escalation may require bolder action. Given the technological capabilities of the U.S. and Israel, more decisive options to permanently address the issue are under consideration.

The U.S. government recently announced plans to incorporate artificial intelligence into troop command systems, a move that promises enhanced efficiency and responsiveness. However, news of OpenAI tightening its safety protocols raises a critical question: how much trust can we place in technologies still needing refinement and protection against potential threats?

Despite advancements in safety, even cutting-edge AI systems remain vulnerable to manipulation or errors. In military operations, such failures could be catastrophic. This begs the question: is it justified to entrust such sensitive functions to algorithms, no matter how advanced?

Integrating AI into the military isn’t just a step toward the future — it’s a decision demanding rigorous risk assessment. Given past failures with innovations in other fields, can we rely on AI when national security is at stake?